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ABSTRACT 
Upstream Tailings Dam – Liquefaction 
Mladen Dragic 
The collapse of Dam I, tailings dam, at Vale S.A.’s (“Vale”) of the Córrego do Feijão Iron 
Ore Mine in Brazil was an accident that caused over 270 casualties and made irreparable damage 
to the surrounding environment. The exact reason for the failure is not known however, 
liquefaction was suspected to be the most influencing factor in the failure.  
Liquefaction failure of impoundment is increasing concern in the mining community and 
especially mine planners who will have to design and build the tailings dam. Different design 
methods are available with varied degree of challenges. Upstream construction methods, as one of 
the tailings dam types, is more susceptible to liquefaction. To investigate the effect of tailings on 
the impoundments, the research effort in this report determined four scenarios that affected the 
impoundment. Slide2, a two dimensional limit equilibrium based program was used to analyze 
four parametric conditions for predicting the failure of the impoundment. Each scenario represents 
a unique case where number of external and internal factors simulated the field condition.  
In addition to the safety factor, regression analysis was conducted to predict the future 
Factor of Safety by varying parameters such as cohesion, relative density, and friction angle. 
Analysis of the given scenarios showed significant sections of the dam stressed due to the weight 
of the tailings with high internal water level. 
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Upstream Tailings Dam – Liquefaction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the Report 
On January 25th, 2019, Dam I at Vale S.A.’s (“Vale”) of the Córrego do Feijão Iron Ore Mine 
in Brazil collapsed and released about 10 million cubic meters of mining wastes that caused over 
270 casualties and massive environmental disaster. 
From an engineering standpoint, there are some unique facts about this failure. First of all, the 
dam showed no indications prior to the collapse. There were several methods enforced to measure 
and detect deformations on the embankment, but none of the preventive measures detected any 
changes within the dam. Secondly, video footage was made and this was a rare situation where the 
embankment failure was recorded. 
As a result of catastrophes in the past few years (the Brumadinho Dam disaster, the Mariana 
Dam disaster), tailings dams became a subject of interest to many governments. Currently, every 
country is reviewing and evaluating its policies to prevent disasters and to secure active and retired 
tailings dams. 
This report is focused on developing four different scenarios representing four different 
conditions of a tailings dam, according to internal and external factors such as groundwater, water 
table, external pressures, and so on. Every scenario will be discussed and presented later in the 
report. 
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In the figures below (Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) the video footage is presented and the look of 
the dam before and during the collapse. 
 
Figure 1 – Dam I before the collapse (Guardian News, 2019) 
 
 
Figure 2 – Dam I when collapse started (Guardian News, 2019) 
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Figure 3 – A few seconds after the collapse started (Guardian News, 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4 – The direction of the mudflow a few seconds after the collapse of the dam (Guardian 
News, 2019) 
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Figure 5 – The wave of the mud flowing downhill (Guardian News, 2019) 
 
1.2 Background 
Dam I looked like any other ordinary tailings dam. According to measuring devices (survey 
monuments, inclinometers, ground-based radar, and others), there were no signs of deficiencies. 
Only a few days before the collapse occurred, a drone was flown over the dam recording a high-
quality video and recorded no sign of concern. 
Although the collapse was not seen as a possible outcome when no distress is presented, indeed 
it happened. The history of the dam’s construction indicates the possible reason for the failure 
(Robertson et al., 2013). 
The dam was built in 10 stages and took about 37 years, using the upstream construction 
method, which will be discussed later. Moreover, that was one of the reasons why the material 
liquefied. According to Robertson et al. (2019), the failure was the result of the static liquefaction 
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within the materials of the dam. Liquefaction within the materials of the tailings dam is well-
known to mining engineers, but it’s still very hard to explain, as well as to control; therefore, 
liquefaction will be discussed later. 
For disposing of significant amounts of waste produced at a mine processing plant, various sites 
are engineered to store the mine wastes that vary in size and design. As the mines are deep and a 
large amount of overburden is handled with waste rock dilution, large tailings disposal facilities 
are required.  
The increasing demand for lower-grade deposits makes it more challenging now to dispose of 
a vast amount of material than ever before. Modern tailing embankments can reach more than 
several hundred feet in height and these impoundments can cover several square miles (US EPA, 
1994). Dams are constructed to be cheap, convenient, environmentally friendly, and they have to 
satisfy: a) long-term stability, b) prevention of environmental contamination of waters, and c) 
returning area for future use.  
Nevertheless, inactive tailing impoundments are also part of the concern due to their shape after 
long-term windblown dispersal, acid drainage, water contamination, etc. Costs of restitution can 
sometimes be even more than the costs of original design and operation. 
Designing the tailings impoundments depends on many factors and they are case-specific. Also, 
designing the impoundment varies in methods, location, and capacity, and it all depends on the 
climate as well as the topographic, geologic, geotechnical, and hydrogeologic characteristics of 
the location, in addition to regulatory requirements related to dam safety and environmental 
performance (US EPA, 1994). 
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Therefore, the initial and final size and design of tailings dams change over time. This happens 
mainly because the initial size and design are based on current regulations and estimated reserves. 
So, while regulations change over time and more reserves are getting proven, new (final) size and 
design need to be created.  
In the table below (Table 1) the raising stages of the tailings dam are presented. 
Table 1 - Embankment raising progress (Robertson et al., 2019) 
Stage Year 
Raising 
ID 
Top 
Elevation 
(m msl) 
Height 
max 
(m) 
Project Design 
Firm 
Construction 
Company 
1 1976 
Starter 
Dam 
(first) 
874 18 Christoph Erb Emtel 
2 1982 
Second 
877 21 
Tecnosan 
Tercam 
3 1983 879 23 Unknown 
4 1984 884 28 
Construtora Sul, 
Minas 
5 1986 889 33 Unknown 
6 1990 891.5 35.5 
Unienge Com. e 
Constr. Ltda. 
7 1991 
Third 
895 39 Chammas 
Engenharia 
Construtora Sul, 
Minas 
8 1993 899 43 Unknown 
9 1995 Fourth 905 49 
Tecnosolo 
CMS Constr. S.A. 
10 1998 Fifth 910 54 U & M 
11 2000 Sixth 916.5 60.5 
Constr. Dragagem 
Paraopeba 
12 2003 Seventh 922.5 66.5 
Construtora Impar 
Ltda. 
13 2004 Eighth 929.5 73.5 Integral 
14 2008 Ninth 937.0 81.0 Geoconsultoria Integral 
15 2013 Tenth 942.0 86.0 Geoconsultoria Salum Enga 
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Tailings dam engineering is part of everyday improvements. A dynamic environment with 
constantly changing conditions requires daily inspections and corrections.  
Three factors that need to be satisfied to have a well-engineered embankment and impoundment 
are:  
• cost, 
• stability, and 
• environmental friendliness. 
This report will focus on slurry tailings because they are the starting point for liquefaction.  
Slurry impoundment can be built in four different forms such as valley impoundment, ring dikes, 
in-pit, and specially dug pits impoundment (Ritcey 1989). Our main focus is on valley 
impoundment because their form is critical when it comes to liquefaction potential.  
For mitigation purposes, some tailings can be: 
• dewatered (when their pulp density thickens to more than 60 percent); or 
• dried (by lowering the moisture content up to 25 percent or less). 
Further information about this will be given later. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Tailings dams are a massive structure and they serve as a wall between mining leftovers and 
free space. In the last several years, tailings impoundments tend to rapidly increase in height, partly 
because there is limited land space, and partly because of production increases by the mine. 
Because of these mentioned reasons, maintaining the stability of the dam is challenging. The most 
critical impoundments are upstream tailings dams because of their construction, which will be 
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discussed later. Other structures like centerline and downstream methods should also be seriously 
considered, but not as much as the upstream construction method. 
The most common cause of a tailings dam instability is nonuniform dams and high pore-
pressure within tailings. Therefore, keeping the pore pressure low by installing and controlling the 
monitoring devices is mandatory to regulate the safety of the dams. Every dam has its upper limit, 
or the heightening rate, at which developing shear failure due to high pore pressure can be 
disregarded. According to Lottermouser (2010), major and minor environmental concerns with 
tailings dams are:  
• the visual impact of the large engineered structure, 
• stability of the dam and potential release of tailings, 
• closure of the tailings dam, 
• release of radiation from tailings, 
• dust generation, 
• seepage from the tailings into the surface and the groundwater. 
The most threatening factors to tailings dam stability, addressed by Priscu (1999) are quality of 
construction materials, the in-situ density of the disposed of materials, location of free water-
surface/saturation table, and characteristics of the downstream slope. Because of the difficulties in 
predicting and controlling material behavior, tailings dams built using sand need special attention.  
The in-situ density of the disposed of materials is in direct relationship with liquefaction. When 
the material is water-saturated and not compacted, susceptibility to liquefy is high. This behavior 
is closely related to the upstream method of construction because of the upper dike’s weak 
foundation. According to Youd et al. (1994) when the water table lies within 10 meters of the 
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ground surface, liquefaction has been most abundant. Moreover, only a few instances of 
liquefaction occurred in the areas where the groundwater was deeper than 20 meters. 
Liquefaction is a state of the soil by which solid sediments temporarily lose strength and behave 
as a viscous liquid (Youd, 1994). Liquefaction does not occur at random but as a result of many 
internal and external factors. 
A recent study from Pacheco (2019) shows that the various trigger factors causing liquefaction 
are: (1) overtopping, (2) internal erosion, (3) erosion of the dam toe, (4) a weak foundation, (5) 
drainage system failure and injection of water, (6) an increasing water table due to rainfall, and (7) 
an increase of the saturation due to input of groundwater, etc. Overtopping is a direct result of 
design error or waves due to strong winds. Sometimes, even erosion of a slope above a tailings 
dam may lead to overtopping the tailings basin with rocks. Some tests showed the possibility of 
liquefaction in materials with a saturation degree of 80% (Martin, 1999). 
According to Pirete and Gomes (2013), liquefaction is a phenomenon of the strain-softening 
and cohesionless soil triggered by static or seismic loading. They state that the flow failure is the 
result of the greater static shear stress more so than the liquefied shear strength. Their research is 
focused on estimating the shear resistance of softened soil using the common SPT (standard 
penetration test) and CPT (cone penetration test) results.  
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1.4 Problem Background 
As previously mentioned, Dam I unexpectedly collapsed on January 25, 2019, releasing 
approximately 9.7 million cubic meters of mining waste, which is about 75% of the total pre-
failure volume of approximately 12.7 million cubic meters with a maximum tailings thickness of 
about 76 meters prior to the failure (Robertson et al., 2019). The mud reached the speed of 20 
meters per second and flowed approximately 5 miles downhill until reaching the Paraopeba River 
(Figure 6), thereby destroying everything in its way such as homes, offices, bridge, the mine’s 
railway branch, etc. (WISE, 2020). The catastrophe was sudden without any major pre-failure 
warning sign that could have possibly alerted management’s attention to prevent the incident.  
According to Robertson et al., (2019) the height of the dam was approximately 80 meters with 
a crest of approximately 700 meters. The evidence from the video footage and the unexpected 
mudslide flow distance shows that the failure was the result of flow liquefaction within the 
materials of the tailings dam.  
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Figure 6 - Tailing’s mudflow down the hill (Darlington et al., 2019) 
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1.5 Tailings Dam Design Methods 
Two types of impoundments, the raised embankment, and the retention dam are commonly 
practiced in the mining industry. A combination of these two construction methods is also 
practiced; however, it is rarely used. Retention dams are often used on rivers as part of the 
hydropower plant, while raised embankments are most common in the mining industry. 
It is important to emphasize that the construction of the tailings dams is designed in advance of 
the mining operations, mainly because the entire construction has to be adjusted to the specific site 
conditions, tailings characteristics, mine and mill management, etc. (Priscu, 1999). 
The main difference between water retention dams and raised embankments is that the 
construction of raised embankments is completed in stages. The first (initial) dike is constructed a 
couple of years after the commencement of the mill operation.  
Raised embankments are built by three different methods (Figure 7): 
a) upstream, 
b) centerline, or 
c) downstream method. 
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Figure 7 - Tailings dam construction methods (US EPA, 1994) 
 
There are about 3,500 active tailings dams around the world.  
The figure below (Figure 8) represents the ratio and distribution of the different types of 
methods of raised embankments in the world.  
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Figure 8 - Worldwide distribution and ratio of tailings dams by methods of construction (Lyu et 
al., 2019) 
1.6 Upstream Tailings Dams 
As the oldest and the most inexpensive method of construction, upstream tailings dams are 
widespread across the globe. The design and construction of the embankments of this type of 
tailings dam start with building a downstream toe first. While discharging material from the top of 
the starter dam using cyclones or spigots, a wide beach is formed from the raw material, and 
immediately it is the foundation for the next dike as shown in Figure 9. Sometimes, new dikes can 
be built from another type of material, which is preferable. Therefore, before building the next 
dike, mechanical compaction is required to consolidate the foundation for the next stage. 
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According to Vick (1990), when the upstream method of construction is being used, the tailings 
should have no less than 40 to 60 percent of sand. The cut off for using the downstream method 
versus the upstream method of construction, according to Brawner (1973), should be the size of 
the particles. If the particle sizes are too fine and a tractor cannot operate within the first 30 to 60 
meters of beach, the upstream method of construction should be avoided (US EPA, 1994). 
 
 
Figure 9 - Upstream method of construction (McLeod and Bjelkevik 2017) 
Some other factors that should be considered in decision-making are:  
• the capacity of water storage. 
• seismic liquefaction susceptibility. 
• phreatic surface control. 
• the rate of dam raising. 
The main characteristic of an embankment built using an upstream method of construction is a 
low relative density with high water saturation (Tailings). Because of that and some other factors, 
such as different magnitude and duration of vibration that are caused by heavy machinery, trains, 
blasting, seismic activity, etc., liquefaction may occur.  
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Shear strength plays an important role in slope stability. To evaluate the stability of the dam 
slope, it is crucial to use the failed relationship, which is shown in Figure 10. For liquefied soil, 
shear strength may be reduced to near zero, which means that the material can easily penetrate the 
dam, and the material can collapse and flow.  
 
 
Figure 10 - The relationship between normal and shear stress during a slide (Chaulya and 
Prasad, 2016) 
The pore pressure within the material limits the height of the embankment and the number of 
dikes. Low pore pressure can lead to shear failure, releasing the tailings downstream. 
As a mitigation factor, drainage zones should be installed at the very beginning of the dam 
construction, which will maintain low pore pressure. Although, it is hard to prevent the blockage 
of drains because the material will usually gather around the drainage system, which may prevent 
contaminated water from flowing out. Therefore, it is very important to maintain the system. 
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Advantages of this construction method are: 
• simple and inexpensive construction. 
• a small amount of material needed to build the starter dam. 
• requires less material for building other dikes. 
Disadvantages are: 
• not recommended for a region with high rainfall, mostly because the structure cannot hold 
a large amount of water. The pond should always be kept as far from the crest as possible. 
• an upstream tailings dam is very sensitive to seismic movements. 
• once a dam is built, it is not suitable for large corrections if some conditions change. 
1.7 Liquefaction 
Liquefaction represents instability within the soil. When water-saturated soil loses stability and 
strength by ground shaking, tailings may behave like liquefied soil and they can pass through 
narrow openings and can stream for a long distance.  
According to Terzaghi’s Principle of Effective Stress, liquefaction will occur when the pore 
pressure is equal to a total normal stress: 
𝜎 = 𝜎′ + 𝑢                      (1) 
𝜎′ =  𝜎 − 𝑢                  (2) 
Where: 𝜎 – total stress, 
𝜎′ - effective stress,  
𝑢 – pore pressure. 
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According to US EPA (1994), factors affecting liquefaction are: 
1) Soil type – if the grain size form suspension, the tailing material is uniform in size (fine 
material). 
2) Relative density or compactness – when a material is not compressed (it is water-saturated), 
it may lead to liquefaction. 
3) Magnitude and duration of the ground shaking - caused by blasting, operating of heavy 
equipment, seismic activities, etc. 
4) Location of the water table – it is preferable to keep the water table close to the foundation; 
etc. 
The calculation for each dam is necessary to obtain a safety factor and to ensure that all 
parameters are incorporated. Having a relative density of 60% of fine sands for the tailings 
embankment, maintaining a low level of the water table – close to the foundation, and satisfying 
other factors may significantly reduce and prevent tailings from liquefaction. A factor of safety 
greater than 1.0 implies that shear strength within a material is greater than a driving force that can 
initiate failure. Nowadays, regulations often require a factor of safety to be at least 1.5. 
Scope of Work 
With a high potential for liquefaction, tailings dams’ stability deserves a serious approach in 
evaluating and calculating factors of safety; while considering factors, such as density, cohesion, 
and friction angle for each type of material used in the dam construction. The overall objective is 
to figure out what external and internal factors may affect the safety factor while keeping 
Geotechnical parameters constant.  
The specific aims of this study are as follows: 
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i. Collect the data for each type of material used; both for the tailings and the dam’s 
construction (density, cohesion, friction angle, height). 
ii. Plug the data into the software, add the water table, and the external pressure of the 
crest of the tailings, to the object. 
iii. Consider multiple scenarios for different external impacts, such as rainfall, ground 
shaking, drought, etc. 
iv. Calculate the safety factors for each scenario. 
v. Apply condition changes within the material and testing the stability of the dam. 
vi. Interpret the results. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to develop four models with the same parameters, where each 
model will be tested for stability from different perspectives, which will be discussed later. To do 
so, the student version software of Slide 2018 from Rocscience Inc. and AutoCAD 2019 from 
Autodesk was used to develop the models. Slide 2018 is a two-dimensional slope stability program 
suitable for evaluating the safety factors or probability of failure, while AutoCAD was used to 
draw the model following full dimensions and the dike's incline angles.  
2.2 Development 
2.2.1 Phase 1 
Firstly, the dam construction is simulated, presented by Pirete (2013), and then, as shown in 
Figure 11, the model is drawn in AutoCAD 2019 with all its Geotechnical characteristics, followed 
by a different color for each type of material. After the initial drawing, the image was exported to 
Slide 2018, whereby each type of material (Table 2) is assigned, and then the water table was 
added along with the constant distribution load of 50 kPa at the crest of the dam simulating the 
pond (Figure 12). 
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For reference, the Bishop Simplified method was used in all four cases. 
Table 2 - Geotechnical parameters of the Dam I (Pirete and Gomes, 2013) 
Material y (kN/m3) C (kPa) ø (°) 
Residual soil (foundation) 20 20 30 
Starter dam (compacted soil) 20 5 36 
Compacted soil 20 10 30 
Compacted tailings 25 5 40 
Dilative tailings 22 20 38 
22 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 - Tailings Dam I profile 
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Figure 12 – Layout of the Dam I in Slide 2018
24 
 
2.2.2 Phase 2 
After the initial drawing and assigning material properties to each part of the dam, the next 
phase was initiated. In Phase 2, the main priority was to define the number and properties for each 
scenario.  
In Scenario I, the focus is on simulating the static of the dam without applying any of the outside 
distractions, which is a common situation during most times of the year. Scenario II is developed 
with the application of horizontal seismic stress. In Scenario III, the target is to calculate the 
intensity of the horizontal seismic coefficient that leads to the safety factor of 1. Lastly, Scenario 
IV represents the situation when the drought is at its peak. In this scenario, the pond is eliminated 
from the crest of the tailings dam and the water table as well, without changing any Geotechnical 
parameters of the materials of the dam.  More about each scenario will be discussed later. 
2.2.3 Phase 3 
For a deeper understanding of the safety factor transition from lower to higher failure 
probability (or vice versa), a multiple regression analysis was conducted. In this report, different 
parameters were taken into consideration of the cohesion and friction angle because, during some 
research, it is concluded that the cohesion and friction angle are parameters that can easily change. 
Parameters are not changed for every part of the dam but only for critical ones, such as the first 
five dikes (out of 10) and tailings deposition. Our parametric study was completed by changing 
one parameter at a time (either cohesion or friction angle) up or down by 1, 2, 3, or 7 while keeping 
everything else constant (default parameters). Therefore, 32 observations were done for each 
scenario, which gives us a total of 128 models. 
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Chapter 3 
Results 
3.1 Scenario I – Safety Factor Calculation 
After the material characteristics were input and assigned to each part of the dam, the safety 
factor was calculated. On the crest of the dam, the water pressure of 50 kN per square meter was 
simulated, and that represented the pond, which is common in rainfall regions. The result showed 
that the most critical part of the slope is the toe (starter dam) and the next three dikes. The safety 
factor for that part of the slope was only 1.305 (Figure 13). 
Proposed flow failure potential range is: 
• FS > 1.5: → Unlikely.  
• 1.3 ≤ FS ≥ 1.5: → Low. 
• 1.1 ≤ FS ≥ 1.3: → Moderate. 
• FS < 1.1: → High. 
Therefore, the resulting safety factor of 1.305 goes to “Low” flow failure potential, which is 
very serious because the upstream tailing methods are very sensitive. Additional inspections, 
repair, and support should be done. 
26 
 
 
Figure 13 - Slope stability under the water pressure
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Parametric analysis for Scenario I 
After performing a regression analysis, it is concluded that not all parameters are significant 
predictors of a safety factor but that some of them are. In the first scenario, coefficients are 
provided in the table below (Table 3). 
Table 3 – Regression analysis coefficients of significant predictors for the first scenario 
 Coefficients 
Intercept 0.041095647 
Starter Dam (Cohesion) - SDC 0.001983246 
Starter Dam (Friction angle) - SDF 0.015944444 
Dilative Tailings (Cohesion) - DTC 0.00021595 
Dilative Tailings (Friction angle) - DTF 0.017611111 
 
According to given coefficients, the safety factor for Scenario I can be predicted by using 
Equation 3: 
𝐹𝑆 =  0.041095647 + 𝑆𝐷𝐶 ∗ 0.001983246 + 𝑆𝐷𝐹 ∗ 0.015944444 + 𝐷𝑇𝐶 ∗ 0.00021595 +
𝐷𝑇𝐹 ∗ 0.17611111                     (3) 
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3.2 Scenario II - Seismic Activity Simulation 
In the second scenario, the horizontal seismic activity showing positive in the direction of 
failure was simulated. A seismic load coefficient of 0.15 was used, which represents the regular 
measure for the US region (coefficient goes from 0.05 to 0.15), therefore the least favorable 
situation (the biggest coefficient) needed to be considered (Table 5). 
Analyzing this situation, the conclusion was that the safety of the dam is jeopardized because 
the factor of safety is 0.935 (Figure 14). 
If an earthquake or any other major seismic activity occurred, the slope would fail because the 
safety factor is below 1.
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Figure 14 – Critical part under the seismic activity 
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Parametric analysis for Scenario II 
After performing a regression analysis, it is concluded that not all parameters are significant 
predictors of the safety factor. In the second scenario, the coefficients are provided in the table 
below (Table 4). 
Table 4 – Regression analysis coefficients of significant predictors for the second scenario 
 Coefficients 
Intercept 0.190470803 
Starter Dam (Cohesion) - SDC 0.00041831 
Starter Dam (Friction angle) - SDF 0.007809524 
Dilative Tailings (Cohesion) - DTC -0.000341046 
Dilative Tailings (Friction angle) - DTF 0.012134921 
 
According to given coefficients, our safety factor for Scenario II can be predicted by using 
Equation 4: 
𝐹𝑆 =  0.190470803 + 𝑆𝐷𝐶 ∗ 0.00041831 + 𝑆𝐷𝐹 ∗ 0.007809524 − 𝐷𝑇𝐶 ∗ 0.000341046 +
𝐷𝑇𝐹 ∗ 0.012134921                     (4) 
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3.3 Scenario III - Critical Acceleration Simulation 
This method falls under the advanced seismic analysis by specifying a horizontal seismic 
coefficient. The factor of safety that is targeted in this situation is 1. By computing the analysis, 
the result shows a horizontal seismic coefficient that is equal to 0.199 (Figure 15). It can be 
identified as a critical coefficient because when it is reached, the factor of safety is 1 and the dam 
stability is endangered. 
Table 5 – Horizontal seismic coefficient (Melo and Sharma, 2004) 
Horizontal Seismic 
Coefficient, kh 
Description 
0.05 – 0.15 In the United States 
0.12 – 0.25 In Japan 
0.1 “severe” earthquakes 
Terzaghi [4] 0.2 “violent, destructive” earthquakes 
0.5 “catastrophic” earthquakes 
0.1 – 0.2 Seed [2], POS ≥ 1.15 
0.10 Major Earthquake, FOS > 1.0 
Corps of Engineers [5] 
0.15 Great Earthquake, FOS > 1.0 
1/2 to 1/3 of PHA Marcuson [6], FOS > 1.0 
1/2 of PHA Hynes-Grifin [7], FOS > 1.0 
FOS = Factor of Safety. PHA = Peak Horizontal Acceleration, in g’s 
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Figure 15 – Critical acceleration simulation
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Parametric analysis for Scenario III 
After performing a regression analysis, it is concluded that not all parameters are significant 
predictors of the safety factor. In the third scenario, the coefficients are provided in the table below 
(Table 6). 
Table 6 – Regression analysis coefficients of significant predictors for the third scenario 
 Coefficients 
Intercept -0.281834749 
Starter Dam (Cohesion) - SDC 0.000629036 
Starter Dam (Friction angle) - SDF 0.004801587 
Dilative Tailings (Cohesion) - DTC -9.70438E-05 
Dilative Tailings (Friction angle) - DTF 0.005873016 
 
According to given coefficients, the horizontal seismic coefficient for Scenario III is predicted 
by using Equation 5: 
𝐻𝑆𝐶 =  −0.281834749 + 𝑆𝐷𝐶 ∗ 0.000629036 + 𝑆𝐷𝐹 ∗ 0.004801587 − 𝐷𝑇𝐶 ∗
9.70438𝐸−05 + 𝐷𝑇𝐹 ∗ 0.005873016                   
  (5) 
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3.4 Scenario IV – Perfect Drainage (No water pressure) 
To try to simulate as many as possible scenarios and analyze dam stability, in the last 
scenario, the water table was eliminated, as well as the water pressure from the crest of the dam. 
This simulation represents the perfect drainage system whereby rain and groundwater do not 
cause any pressure on the dam and tailings. This scenario is unlikely possible but could happen.  
As a result of this simulation method, the factor of safety is 1.449 (Figure 16), which is 
satisfying, and the dam is safe when the dam is completely dry.  
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Figure 16 – Completely dry tailings dam
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Parametric analysis for Scenario IV 
After performing a regression analysis, it is concluded that not all parameters are significant 
predictors of safety factor but that some of them are. For the fourth scenario, coefficients are 
provided in the table below (Table 7). 
Table 7 – Regression analysis coefficients of significant predictors for the fourth scenario 
 Coefficients 
Intercept 0.038962569 
Starter Dam (Cohesion) - SDC 0.014907507 
Starter Dam (Friction angle) - SDF 0.027492063 
Dilative Tailings (Cohesion) - DTC 0.000216839 
Dilative Tailings (Friction angle) - DTF 0.008849206 
 
According to the given coefficient, the safety factor for the Scenario IV can be predicted by 
using Equation 6: 
𝐹𝑆 =  0.038962569 + 𝑆𝐷𝐶 ∗ 0.014907507 + 𝑆𝐷𝐹 ∗ 0.027492063 − 𝐷𝑇𝐶 ∗ 0.000216839 +
𝐷𝑇𝐹 ∗ 0.008849206                     (6) 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
It is hard to ascertain any single factor that triggered the collapse of Dam I. There were a handful 
of reasons why the failure occurred.  
According to given scenarios, it is obvious that the tailings dam had some deficiencies. The 
lack of proper construction, management, maintenance, internal drainage, high iron content, 
seepage, and so on, caused the failure. 
Some articles have stated that workers alerted management about the problems with the dam, 
but for some reason, the company’s representatives stayed silent. 
We hope a disaster like this will never happen again. 
4.1 Environmental Impact 
Toxic mud flowed for five miles, destroying homes, and offices, and killing people. The 
Brazilians had not seen a catastrophe like this before.  
The slurry traveled downhill to the Rio Paraopeba River, killing most of the animals and 
contaminating the drinking water along the river.  
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Figure 17 - Tailing’s mudflow (Darlington et al., 2019) 
 
The historical record of the tailings from 2006 showed a high concentration of iron (more than 
50%) and a low concentration of silica (less than 10%). Corresponding to that, high toxicity left a 
significant footprint on the river and the surrounding soil, as shown in Figure 17. It impacted the 
nearby crops and drinking water, and it will take decades for nature to recover itself. The point of 
environmental protection is not to calculate the costs when an incident occurs, it is about taking 
steps to prevent a recurring catastrophe. Reparations to a plant after the incident occurred is shown 
in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18 - Reparations to a plant after the incident (Darlington et al., 2019) 
 
4.2 Economic Impact 
Instead of investing probably a couple of thousand dollars in mitigating the slope, the company, 
Vale S.A., the owners of the mine, eventually faced expenses of billions of dollars in lawsuits and 
reimbursements. The total cost of the disaster has not been calculated yet, but surely it can be said 
that it will significantly impact Vale’s business and the entire iron ore market. Vale vowed 27,000 
US dollars to families for each life lost in the disaster. But it must be noted that not only direct 
costs play a role, but there are also indirect costs too. The company’s public image has been 
seriously jeopardized. 
Figure 19 shows the iron ore stock market price in the last couple of years. 
On a single day, when the disaster occurred, Vale S.A. stock price fell by 24%, losing US$19 
billion in market capitalization. 
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Figure 19 - Iron ore stock market (Diss, 2019) 
 
After the catastrophe, all deficiencies related to upstream tailings dam construction came to the 
surface and the Brazilian government ordered the closure, repair, or inspection of every tailings 
dam that had a moderate or likely chance of failure.   
4.3 Social Impact 
Most of the community around the mine looked at the company as the only source of income. 
Many family members worked at the mine to keep the bread on the table.  
After the catastrophe, society is still divided. Half of them are still very disappointed and angry 
with the company management because they did not take the workers’ alert seriously. The other 
half said that they would still work there because they did not have any other source of income.  
Vale betrayed the Brumadinho community. The salaries of mineworkers in Brazil are not worth 
being exposed to a catastrophe.  
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Even though the company promised that every dam would be inspected, and recommendations 
seriously considered after the disaster with the Mariana Dam in November 2015, they have failed 
to do that. 
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